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¶1

¶2

¶3

¶4

The United States’ policy on intellectual property (“IP”) rights for the life sciences
grants broad patent rights to private industry. While this type of IP regime is common in
developed nations, and in the United States in particular, developing nations do not have
a comparable internal infrastructure for intellectual property rights. The private sector’s
influence has shaped IP policy in the United States, and has likewise shaped IP policies
championed by the United States internationally through the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (“USTR”).
The result is a stringent patent regime for genetically modified seeds in both
developed nations (the source for and consumers of IP protected seeds) and developing
nations (the purchasers of IP protected seeds). IP protections on seed development have
repercussions for trade, business, and food development issues. Recent dramatic
developments in technology have opened new doors for seed developers and marketers.
Rapid consolidation created a global industry primarily controlled by a few large
corporations. As a result, the seed industry is now a global $15 billion industry.1
The private seed industry has made tremendous commercial gains as a result of
strong IP protections on its products. The public also benefits, as these protections foster
innovation, ingenuity, and research for new and improved products.2
IP rights are likewise at the forefront of the United States’ trade agenda, just as they
are priorities on the private seed industry’s agenda.3 The United States is seen as having
the strongest protections for IP rights world-wide.4 Agribusinesses in the United States

* J.D. May 2005, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. May 1999, Tufts University.
1
JEREMY RIFKIN, HARVESTING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD: THE BIOTECH CENTURY 68
(1998).
2
J.M. Spectar, Patent Necessity: Intellectual Property Dilemmas in the Biotech Domain & Treatment
Equity for Developing Countries, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L 227, 234 (2002).
3
United States Trade Representative, USTR’s Role in Trade Policy, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html (last visited April 20, 2005) (“The Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international
trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing negotiations with other countries. The
head of USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative, a Cabinet member who serves as the President’s principal
trade advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade issues.”).
4
Spectar, supra note 2, at 235.
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wield an enormous amount of power in shaping IP biotechnology policies, as recent trade
agreements reflect.5
Increased investment and unprecedented returns on these investments in
agricultural biotechnology have brought issues of IP protection to the forefront.
Agricultural biotechnology is a technique used by scientists to create, improve, or modify
plants. Genetic engineering is one example of a biotechnological technique. For
centuries, farmers have used selective breeding to improve seed production. Recent
advances in science and technology now allow genetic engineers to easily and precisely
move genes to improve plants and seeds.6
Agricultural biotechnology has enormous economic and humanitarian potential:
“the great hope for genetically engineered crops is that they will feed the world.”7 There
are vast benefits: more productive harvests, improved food quality (such as vitaminenriched products), and decreased dependence on environmentally dangerous chemicals
and pesticides.8 Yet there are many unknowns regarding genetically modified foods.
There is no scientific confirmation that these foods are safe and many countries are
adamantly opposed to the marketing of genetically altered foods.9 There are also fears of
increased resistance to pesticides, adaptation of insects, unknown environmental impacts,
and detrimental effects on the plants’ gene pool.10
The ability of humans to genetically manipulate seeds through science has altered
the agricultural landscape for both large farming corporations and small family farms.
While genetic modification provides many advantages for small farmers, particularly in
developing countries, there are likewise many drawbacks.11 Agribusiness domination of
the global seed market and aggressive campaigns to promote broad patenting rights for
biotech seeds and plants challenge traditional farming practices such as seed saving and
seed sharing. Up to this point, the United States’ has been the most vocal advocate of
bolstering these IP rights on the international front.
In this paper, I will consider three aspects of the business of genetic seed
modification. First, I will look at the development of the U.S. seed industry and
patentability from a historical and judicial perspective. I will examine how legislative
and judicial decisions sculpted a complex and private-sector friendly IP jurisprudence for
biotechnology. This evolution led to the erosion of traditional rights of farmers, as
embodied by the development of “Terminator Technology.”12
Second, I will examine how private business shaped U.S. foreign trade policy and
how trade was used by the United States as a conduit to expand intellectual property
5

See generally Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property and Trade: The Quest for
TRIPS, and Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79 (2002).
6
United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Biotechnology FAQ’s (April 2001), available at
http://www.nal.usda.gov/bic/ (last visited April 20, 2005).
7
Lara E. Ewens, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the Quest for High Yield Seeds,
23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 295 (2000).
8
Henrique Freire de Oliviera Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for International Regulation,
6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 138 (2000).
9
Id. at 138-39.
10
Id. at 139. See also RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 17.
11
Samantha M. Ohlgart, The Terminator Gene: Intellectual Property Rights v. The Farmers’ Common
Law Right to Save Seed, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 473, 474 (2002).
12
“Terminator technology” is a biotechnological development created to prevent seeds from
reproducing after the first harvest — in effect “terminating” the seed and preventing future use.
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rights in plant life sciences internationally. I will focus on how U.S. business interests
have shaped policies now affecting developing nations.
¶10
Third, I will argue that the pro-business approach by the USTR inhibits progress
for developing nations. A more productive international IP policy would shift the legal
and policy focus from protection of agribusiness interests to an encouragement of
partnerships between the public, private, and academic sectors in developing nations.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SEEDS: PAST TO PRESENT
¶11

The history of property rights over farming in the United States is a study in how
large businesses and major industries develop out of small, family owned enterprises.
Likewise, the evolution of intellectual property rights regarding seeds and plants is a
study in the process of commodification.
¶12
In this section, I will look first at the development of the U.S. agricultural sector
and private seed industry. Second, I will analyze the governmental shift from public to
private interests in federal legislation. Third, I will look at key judicial decisions granting
broad patent rights for living things. I will then turn to the agribusiness industry today
and the development of Terminator Technology.
A. Historical Look at Seeds and Agriculture
¶13

Until recently, certain concepts were universally accepted among farmers. First,
out of economic necessity, farmers had the right to save, replant, and resell seeds to other
farmers willing to buy seeds with desirable characteristics. Second, the genetic
composition of seeds, rather than the seed itself, was considered part of a common
heritage and widely shared among farmers. Third, seeds were not seen as a commodity;
rather, the right to use and reproduce seeds was inherent in the first purchase of the seed.
Until the nineteenth century, seeds were seen as a public commons which were bred and
then freely distributed by the public sector.
1.

¶14

Seed saving

For thousands of years, farmers saved seeds with the most beneficial characteristics
to replant for the next harvest.13 Many claim the practice of saving seeds is the basis for
the contemporary concepts of savings and investments.14 Until recently, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) not only freely developed and distributed seeds,
but encouraged seed saving by farmers.15 Seed saving is an ingrained part of agriculture,
and today it is believed that over eighty percent of farmers in developing nations rely on
saved seeds for survival.16

13
Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology Controversy: Intellectual
Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seeds, 41 B.C. L.
REV 627, 647 (2000).
14
Laurent Belsie, Plants Without Seeds Challenge Historic Farming Practices, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 30, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2369524 (“Saving seed shaped more modern notions of
savings and investment.”).
15
Oczek, supra note 13, at 631.
16
Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 488.
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Since natural seeds reproduce themselves indefinitely, traditionally, farmers either
replanted seeds with successful traits or sold them to other farmers.17 Seed saving
developed because, until very recently, seeds were not viewed as a commodity — crop
plant genetics were considered common property.18 Yet, because seeds were seen as a
commons, shared by all, there was little private investment in seed development and
therefore a very small seed industry.19 Seed buyers purchased not only the product (the
seed), but also the means of production. Farmers did not need to buy seeds yearly from a
company.20
2.

¶16

A nation’s self-sufficiency depends on its ability to provide its own labor and food,
and the United States is no exception. In the United States, settlers from Europe
borrowed seeds, such as maize, from Native Americans when the seeds they transported
from Europe failed to produce crops.21 In fact, the United States’ agricultural industry is
built upon sharing seeds from around the world.22 Until recently, there was a Jeffersonian
tradition in the United States of sharing and importing genetic seed material.23 The
federal government supported seed collection and sharing in order to build a stable
agriculture system.24 In the mid-to-late 1800s, the federal government established a
distribution program of free seeds, as well as agriculture schools to collect and distribute
seeds.25 The sharing of genetic material from seeds was not only allowed, but
encouraged by federal involvement. By 1878, the USDA allocated at least a third of its
budget to seed collection and free distribution. In 1879, it distributed over 1.1 billion
seed packets.26
3.

¶17

Seed sharing

Commodification

A commodity is a good that can be sold and does not have the ability to reproduce
itself. In other words, the purchaser must return to the seller for the good once it is fully
used.27 While the free distribution of seeds was beneficial for federal government
objectives, it ran counter to the interests of the fledgling private U.S. seed industry. In

17

Ewens, supra note 7, at 286.
Id. See also Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 482 (seed saving is an historical and traditional right for
farmers).
19
Keith Aoki, With Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 247, 253 (2003).
20
Id. at 260.
21
Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 297, 299 (1999).
22
Oczek, supra note 13, at 631.
23
See Aoki, supra note 19, at 264. The term “Jeffersonian” refers to Thomas Jefferson’s vision of the
United States as an agrarian republic composed of independent farmers. THE READERS COMPANION TO
AMERICAN HISTORY: JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY, available at
http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_047600_jeffersonian.htm (last visited April 20,
2005).
24
Aoki, supra note 19, at 264.
25
Id.
26
Blair, supra note 21, at 301.
27
Aoki, supra note 19, at 250.
18
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1883, the first seed lobbying group was formed, the American Seed Trade Association
(“ASTA”).28
In 1908, the process of seed hybridization developed.29 Hybridization, or
scientifically combining and breeding seeds, was the first method by which companies
were able to control replanting of seeds.30 For the first time, farmers were able to
purchase improved seeds for a better crop. The drawback was that the second generation
of crops did not fare as well as the first generation.31 Therefore, farmers had annually to
return to seed companies to buy the improved product.32 Major hybrid successes (such as
a 700% increase in the return on hybrid corn seed investment) meant that seed
development was moving to the private from the public sector.33
Mounting pressure on the federal government from seed lobbying groups and other
parties in the private sector spurred Congress to repeal the free seed distribution program
in 1924.34
The 1980 Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty laid the legal
groundwork for the “privatization and commodification” of the genetics of seeds.35 The
seed industry underwent a rapid change. By 1996, the first patented commerciallygrown, genetically-modified food crops were planted in the United States.36 By 1997,
U.S. farmers planted more than 8 million acres of genetically engineered soy and more
than 3.5 million acres of genetically engineered corn.37
Commodification also led to massive consolidation in the biotech industry, a trend
that continues today, as illustrated by Monsanto’s recent string of acquisitions.38 Since
the early nineties, Monsanto has purchased Holden’s Foundation Seed for $1.2 billion,
acquired a forty percent hold on the seed company Dekelo, and gained full ownership of
Asgrow, Agracetus, and Global Calgene — all major players in the global seed
industry.39
B. Privately Influenced Federal Legislation

¶22

Patent rights are constitutionally guaranteed under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution.40 The rationale of the patent system is to protect ideas and promote research
and innovation.41 Until 1930, plants and seeds were not seen as patentable material

28

Blair, supra note 24, at 302.
See Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 479.
30
Id.
31
Ewens, supra note 7, at 288.
32
Oczek, supra note 13, at 633.
33
Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 480. See also Aoki, supra note 19, at 272.
34
Blair, supra note 24, at 303. See also Aoki, supra note 19, at 267.
35
447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 43.
36
Id. at 18.
37
Id.
38
This acquisition trend is not limited to the seed industry. Biotechnology companies corner the global
market in other biotech areas. Novartis is the world’s larges agrochemical company, the second largest
seed company, the second largest pharmaceutical company, and the fourth largest veterinary medical
company in the world. RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 69.
39
See RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 69.
40
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
41
Ewens, supra note 7, at 291.
29
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because they were a product of nature and not amenable to the written requirement
description for patents.42 The realization of commercial potential by private business
encouraged Congressional legislation to transition seed development from the public to
the private sector.43
The U.S. Plant Patent Act of 1930 (“PPA”) granted property rights for privately
developed plant varieties for asexually reproducing plants.44 Patent rights were extended
to “distinct and new” asexually reproduced plants for a period of seventeen years.45 This
legislation departed from traditional U.S. patent law because living things could receive a
patent under a more lenient standard than the traditional requirements of being useful,
non-obvious, and novel.46
Not fully satisfied with the limitation of asexual reproduction in the PPA, private
industry pushed for an extension of patenting rights to sexually reproduced plants.47 By
the 1950s, private brand name seeds became more ubiquitous than government seeds.48
In the U.S. Patent Act of 1952, Congress moved the PPA to a separate section.49
The protection provided by the PPA continued to encourage the privatization of the
seed industry, even though seeds were not included under the PPA.50 Decades of lobbying
coupled with advances in breeding technology provided the momentum for the 1970
Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”).51 The PVPA provided protection for sexual
reproduction in plants, including seed germination.52 Most commercial crops were now
protected by patent laws for seventeen years.53 While this was a significant victory for
private seed industry, it was limited by two major exemptions: seed saving by farmers
and for research purposes.54 Under the PVPA “brown bag” exemption, farmers could
continue to save, replant, and resell protected seeds to other farmers.55
The PVPA was indicative of a growing rift between the United States and foreign
countries many of which still recognized the traditions of seed saving and sharing.56 The
Act set the stage for the creation of today’s large agribusinesses. The 1970s saw the
consolidation of large seed businesses followed by phase-out of governmental seed
variety release in the 1980s.57 In 1998, ten companies controlled thirty percent of the
seed trade worldwide.58 The issue was next tackled by the courts.

42

See Spectar, supra note 2. See also Blair, supra note 21, at 310.
Blair, supra note 21, at 232; see also Oczek, supra note 13, at 633.
44
U.S. Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2003).
45
Id.
46
Aoki, supra note 19, at 280.
47
Id. at 281.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 282.
50
Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 480; Blair, supra note 21, at 310.
51
Sell, supra note 5, at 83; see also Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2000).
52
Spectar, supra note 2, at 233; see also Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2000).
53
Ewens, supra note 7, at 292.
54
Id. at 293.
55
Aoki, supra note 19, at 284. The research exception provides,
“The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this Act.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 2544 (1970).
56
Id. at 283-84.
57
Aoki, supra note 19, at 285-86.
58
Ewens, supra note 7, at 288.
43
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C. Judicial Decisions: Opening the Way for Broad Patents
¶27

The 1980 Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty set in motion the trend
towards the “legal acceptance of the commodification . . . of germplasm.”59 The series of
biotech patenting cases that followed during the 1980s and 1990s not only greatly
expanded the legal boundaries of patentable living matter, but also narrowed the
traditional seed saving exemption for farmers codified by the PVPA.60 Judicial decisions
“were rendered in order to spur biotechnology innovation and progress,” and in doing so,
they established “perhaps the most complex and sophisticated [patent] framework in the
world.”61
¶28
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court laid the legal foundation that
would establish the United States as the global biotech patent leader.62 In a 5-4 decision,
Justice Burger articulated that the threshold question for patentability of an organism was
not whether it was inanimate, but whether it was a product of nature or of human
invention.63 The court went on to hold that a live, man-made bacterium was patentable
under the PPA by interpreting the statutory language broadly.64 While this case dealt
specifically with a form of bacteria, this holding had clear implications for plant life. The
Court’s generous interpretation of the PPA and the passage of the PVPA established a
new standard for invention that focused on “natural” products and products of “human
effort.”65 Diamond v. Chakrabarty opened the floodgates for broader definitions of what
is patentable.
¶29
With this foundation in place, Ex Parte Hibberd helped to complete the process of
seed commodification five years later.66 In this case, the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences reversed the Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) decision that held that
the PPA and PVPA were the only sources of patent protection for plants. Hibberd, which
dealt with patenting of maize plant technologies that included seeds, allowed plant
patents to be included under the broad category of utility patents.67 Utility patents are
preferred by plant breeders because they allow patenting of the individual components of
varieties.68 In Hibberd, the claimant made over 260 separate claims for a single item that
included DNA sequences and genes.69 Even though this was an agency decision, it had a
profound effect on germplasm patenting.70 After Hibberd, the PTO granted over 1800
expansive utility patents for germplasm.71

59

447 U.S. at 321; see also Aoki, supra note 19, at 302.
Aoki, supra note 19, at 303.
61
Shraddha A. Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the
Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 65, 108-109 (2002).
62
Id. at 108.
63
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
64
Id. at 310-314.
65
Oczek, supra note 13, at 641.
66
Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985); Aoki, supra note 19, at 303.
67
Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 443.
68
Aoki, supra note 19, at 288; Blair, supra note 21, at 317.
69
Aoki, supra note 19, at 288.
70
Blair, supra note 21, at 317.
71
Aoki, supra note 19, at 288.
60
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¶30

Between the 1985 Hibberd decision and the 1995 Supreme Court decision in
Asgrow Seed v. Winterboer,72 the U.S. seed industry consolidated even more and became
dominated by large agribusinesses such as Monsanto and Dupont.73 Seed industry
mergers and acquisitions created an atmosphere ripe for the advent of genetic
engineering.74
¶31
The common law right of saving seeds was further eroded by Asgrow Seed v.
Winterboer.75 In this case, a seed company sued an Iowa farming couple for PVPA
violations.76 The couple saved the PVPA patented seeds bought from the company and
sold the second generation seeds to a third party.77 The farmers claimed protection under
the PVPA seed saving exemption, but the Supreme Court rejected this claim in an 8-1
decision.78 In this decision, the seed saving exemption was narrowed to cover only
farmers who saved seeds to replant on his or her own property.79 Asgrow Seed is
indicative of the trend of large businesses suing their small farm customers rather than
other large businesses.80 The ruling showed that the Supreme Court now viewed seeds as
a licensed commodity.81
¶32
In 2001, the Court again expanded the definition of what is patentable and again
diluted the PPA and PVPA exemptions. In J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Pioneer Hi-Bred, a large seed company, sued a small Iowa seed supply
company, Farm Advantage, for violating patents on hybrid corn seed.82 Farm Advantage
claimed that as a matter of law, the utility patents were invalid.83 Justice Thomas, writing
for the majority, concluded that newly developed plant breeds are covered by expansive
utility patents and that neither the PPA nor the PVPA can limit the scope of a utility
patent.84 The majority’s broad interpretation of legislative acts reinforced the position of
seed patent holders.85
¶33
The Court recognized the PVPA exemption for saving seeds, but this restriction is
not covered by utility patents.86 While the majority relies on Chakrabarty as the
controlling case, the dissent by Justice Breyer87 and concurrence by Justice Scalia88 both
emphasize that Chakrabarty is not the controlling case and does not cover plant
patenting. In effect, the majority’s ruling in J.E.M. would render meaningless not only

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Asgrow Seed v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aoki, supra note 19, at 292.
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 481.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 140.
Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 144 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the seed saving exception in the PVPA, but the intent of Congress in passing both the
PPA and the PVPA.89
D. Terminator Technology
¶34

Once thought of as part of the commons, genetic information had now become a
marketable good.90 Nothing illustrates this shift more than the development of
Terminator Technology.
¶35
One of the major frustrations for the private seed industry is the perseverance of the
seed saving tradition among farmers. Large businesses such as Monsanto now require
purchasing farmers to sign contracts that prevent the saving of genetically modified
seed.91 However, these contracts only work if farmers abide by them, and enforcement is
especially difficult in developing nations.92
¶36
One of the most controversial developments in recent years is the biological means
to enforce these paper contracts and also to avoid patent limitations: Terminator
Technology.93 In 1998, Delta and Pine Land Company (DPL) partnered with the U.S.DA
to patent the Technology Protection System (“Terminator” Technology).94 By modifying
seeds with certain genes, companies ensure that next generation of seeds self-destructs
and is unable to reproduce.95 A few days after the patent was issued, Monsanto bid $1.76
billion to acquire it from DPL, an indication of the high stakes involved with
biotechnology patents.96 The international protest from farming, environmental, and
development agencies was so great that in 1999, Monsanto said it would not market the
Terminator Technology.97 Despite this promising action, a spokesperson for the USDA, a
co-developer of the technology, stated that the terminator process was still several years
away from being commercially available, indicating that plans for future use remain.98
Other major agriculture businesses in the United States and the United Kingdom are
developing their own sterile seeds.99
¶37
A Monsanto spokesperson claimed there was no conspiracy by the agriculture
industry to create a dependency on seed products and that the technology is simply “a
way to protect their [company’s] billions of dollars of investment into research on
biologically-engineered products.”100 Yet, Terminator Technology has brought seedsaving to the forefront of international policy agendas. While businesses espouse the
benefits of Terminator Technology by citing, for example, the hope that more innovative
and advantageous seeds would be developed and research on staple crops would increase,
many international lobbying groups and activists do not see the technology in the same

89

Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 41.
91
Aoki, supra note 19, at 255.
92
Ewens, supra note 7, at 306.
93
Id. at 306.
94
Ohlgart, supra note 11, at 473.
95
For an extensive discussion on how the technology works, see id.
96
Id. at 477.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 484.
99
Id.
100
Id. at n.67.
90
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light.101 Critics argue that small farmers will be the most affected by the technology –
being least able to afford more expensive seeds on a yearly basis.102 There are also fears
that sterile seeds may have a disastrous effect on the global food supply and are a serious
problem for developing world farmers, the majority of whom depend on seed saving.103
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES: STRONG IP PROTECTIONS CHAMPIONED BY THE
USTR
¶38

The biotechnology industry and the development of genetically modified foods is a
multi-billion dollar per year industry. According to Merrill Lynch, the market for
genetically engineered seeds globally will increase from $450 million in 1995 to $6.6
billion in 2005.104 Wall Street and private investors liken recent developments in
biotechnology to the “discovery of fire.”105 Genetically modified products are hard to
avoid; in the United States, sixty to seventy percent of food sold contains some substance
developed through biotechnology.106 Naturally, with such high stakes, agribusinesses
continue to advocate for the stringent patent policies that have been beneficial for them.
¶39
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”), adopted in 1994, is the controlling international agreement on patent policy,
including plant and seed patents.107 TRIPS, along with other international agreements,
monitors whether domestic policy choices of participating nations meet international
norms.108 The TRIPS agreement came out of the same round of GATT negotiations that
established the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), and any nation wishing to
participate in the WTO must adhere to TRIPS.109 The driving force behind the formation
of TRIPS was to curb international abuse of patented technology, infringement, and
misappropriations.110 These issues are at the forefront of the United States’ trade policy,
as the United States is the world leader in the development of intellectual property
rights.111 Yet, for most of the world, and especially for developing nations, global IP
policies as determined by the United States are divergent from national interests and are

101

Oczek, supra note 13, at 656.
Daniel Knight, Agro-Giants Expand ‘Terminator’ Seed Technology, INTER PRESS SERVICE, February
10, 1999.
103
Ewens, supra note 7, at 306.
104
Id. at 289.
105
See RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 43 (Stated by an analyst for EF Hutton. To illustrate how lucrative the
biotech industry is, Genetech, a small start-up bioengineering company, went public in 1980 at an opening
price of $35 per share. During the first twenty minutes of trading, stocks went up to $89 per share. By the
end of the day, Genetech raised $36 million and was valued at $532 million, and the company had yet to
produce a marketable product).
106
Souza, supra note 8, at 131.
107
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
108
Graeme W. Austin, Symposium on Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: The Role of
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inappropriate to national infrastructures.112 Traditionally, IP and patent policies have
struck a balance between individual and societal interests.113 TRIPS indicates how
current international standards do not adequately follow this tradition.
¶40
In this section, I first will look at how IP policy was influenced by businesses in the
United States and how this policy set the standard for international trade. Second, I will
investigate the post-TRIPS actions taken by the United States. Third, I will discuss the
resulting tensions created by TRIPS and TRIPS-like trade regimes between the Northern
hemisphere (primarily the developed world) and the Southern hemisphere (primarily the
developing world).
A. Business Influence on U.S. IP Policy
Patent policies have historically been enacted to further national interests.114
Complex national patent regimes, such as those established in the United States, require
time and a developed manufacturing infrastructure.115 Many developing nations’
economies are at the same level as the United States during the Great Depression. That
is, industrialization and agriculture are not firmly rooted in the economy.116 It took the
United States 150 years to establish its own complex patent regime. Most developing
nations in Africa only attained independence in the mid-twentieth century.117
¶42
On the other hand, seed businesses have an inherent interest in the potential
markets of agriculture-based developing nations. Intellectual property protections
imposed through trade are used to protect those markets for these businesses. By
imposing patent protections and high licensing fees on new seed products, large seed
manufacturers are able not only to capture a large share of the market, but also to earn
billions through fees from other organizations. Businesses also use trade to protect their
research and development investments abroad.118 The development of TRIPS is a perfect
illustration of how businesses influence trade agreements. The journey towards TRIPS
began in the U.S. private sector a few decades ago.119
¶43
The perceived decline in U.S. competitiveness in the 1970s and 1980s spurred
policy trends that focused on restoring U.S. dominance in trade.120 The lucrative potential
of the technology sector brought IP interests to the forefront of the United States trade
agenda.121 The USTR became a key office in the U.S. government and a lead agency for
¶41
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investment and trade issues in the 1970s.122 Through this office, private businesses
increased their influence on U.S. trade policy.123
¶44
U.S. companies saw success in exploiting influence with the USTR to promote
protectionist IP policies abroad.124 In the early 1980s, CEOs of major technology,
chemical, and agricultural companies successfully organized into a powerful lobbying
machine.125 Under pressure from high-level private sector officials, the USTR began a
series of meetings focusing on IP protections with various countries that were viewed as a
threat to U.S. IP interests.126 During the Reagan administration, private sector players
had easy access to high level policy developers. Bodies such as the Advisory Committee
for Trade Negotiations (“ACTN”), composed of U.S. business leaders, established
official lines of communication between the public and private sector. Following the
advice of these committees, the U.S. government focused more on IP as a way to
maintain U.S. competitiveness.127
¶45
The Intellectual Property Committee (“IPC”), composed of major business CEOs,
was formed in 1984 to advise the USTR on the IP issues of the GATT agenda. Jacques
Gorlin, a private sector consultant for the IPC, authored a paper which became the private
sector IP mantra and the basis of U.S. IP policy to this day.128 The paper focused the
United States on three goals for its IP policy: international minimum standards, an
enforcement mechanism, and a dispute settlement mechanism.129 Developing countries
were opposed to the inclusion of IP in any international agreements.130 One of the most
controversial aspects of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (which resulted in the
WTO and TRIPS, 1986-1994) was the United States’ insistence of IP jurisdiction based
on the goals articulated by U.S. private interests.131 The objection of developing nations
was overridden by the developed countries and the Gorlin paper goals were codified in
the final TRIPS agreement. TRIPS established minimum IP standards for countries and
created an international enforcement mechanism.132 According to Gorlin, the “IPC got
95% of what it wanted [in TRIPS].”133
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¶46

In 1988, American businesses had another controversial legislative victory with the
creation of Section 182 of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974, more commonly known as
Special 301.134 Dissatisfied with the available international implementation mechanisms
at the time, the United States was able to secure, in Special 301, another mechanism for
protecting its private industry by allowing it to identify countries that do not provide
adequate IP protections.135 Special 301 then encourages these identified countries to
improve their practices.136
¶47
TRIPS was an overwhelming success for commercial interests, and private
industry’s aggressive tactics continue to play a major role in U.S. IP policy
development.137 The USTR “has been remarkably responsive to the expressed wishes of
these key private sector actors.”138 In 1998, the USTR stated that TRIPS Council
meetings were useful tools to keep developing nations in line with U.S. interpretations of
TRIPS.139
B. Post TRIPS Strategy
¶48

While many view TRIPS compliance as too much of a burden on the developing
world, many businesses see the agreement as too generous.140 TRIPS provides an
extended compliance period for developing nations, which some view as excessive.141 In
addition, TRIPS provides assistance for developing nations in implementing its minimum
standards.142 Article 27 of TRIPS provides certain patent exceptions for agri-chemicals
and plants and for public policy, health, and environmental reasons.143 While advocates
for developing nations say these exceptions will not be very effective, the USTR argued
for the stricter exemptions articulated in Ex Parte Hibberd.144
¶49
Because businesses view TRIPS as not going far enough, they have a wellorganized strategy to ensure strict implementation of the agreement. The three main
private sector post-TRIPS strategies are: (1) the use of the WTO dispute settlement
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mechanism, (2) the use of the TRIPS Council Process, and (3) the execution of Special
301.
¶50
In order to set strong precedents under WTO IP jurisprudence, industry lobbyists
carefully select which infringement cases they will pursue.145 Since private companies do
not have standing under the WTO, they depend on the USTR to bring their suits.146 A
former Counselor to the USTR said that when filing suits, USTR lawyers work very
closely with the counsels of the private parties, i.e. large businesses.147 This close
collaboration has made the United States the most strident enforcer of TRIPS. Through
the alliance of the USTR and private industry, the United States has filed more TRIPS
complaints than all other WTO countries combined.148
¶51
The United States has also been uncompromising in its application of Special 301,
despite WTO member protests. Special 301, “has done more than any other provision of
U.S. trade law to improve the level of worldwide protection of U.S. products embodying
copyright.”149 Yet WTO members protest the use of Special 301 to enforce TRIPS
compliance because they believe it exceeded the GATT mandate.150
¶52
Trade policy is meant to seek compensation when TRIPS is violated and also
ensure future compliance. U.S. companies stand to lose billions of dollars a year if
TRIPS is not aggressively enforced.151
C. Effects of Current International Policy: North v. South
¶53

TRIPS and similar policies that encourage strong IP protections benefit developed
nations. But their effects on developing nations are less obvious. The “North” (the
developed Northern hemisphere such as the United States and European Union countries)
and the “South” (the developing nations of the Southern hemisphere, including African
and Asian nations) are in conflict over the issue.152
¶54
The tropics and subtropics of the South have most of the world’s natural genetic
resources, yet most patent holders of genetically modified seeds are in the North.153
Northern corporations are able to freely acquire Southern genetic resources based on the
Southern hemisphere concept of a “common heritage framework” that sees genes as
common property.154 The result is a “one way valve for property claims” — there is an
uncompensated exchange of information between the North and South.155 Northern
companies take Southern genetic resources, engineer them to create a patentable seed,
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and then sell the patented product back to the South. Northern companies claim “natural
rights” to protect their information and products.156
¶55
The marketing of the thaumatin plant, an indigenous plant of West Africa,
illustrates this point. Thaumatin is the sweetest substance on earth and has been used for
centuries by local villagers in West Africa.157 In 1993, a patent was awarded to a Korean
corporation in partnership with a U.S. university.158 Billions will be collected by the
patent holders from the low-calorie sweetener industry, while West Africa will not
receive any of the profits.159
¶56
TRIPS standardized this process of patenting internationally.160 The value of the
patent is lucrative for the North, but the value of the patent system in the South is
controversial at best. First, developing nations bear the enormous cost of systematizing
foreign patent concepts in their own judiciaries. Secondly, many farmers in the South
lack the capital to buy the improved seeds sold to them by the North.161 Third, Southern
seed innovations passed down from generation to generation are not compensated.162 In
the next section, I will look at current international efforts aimed at closing this rift.
III. LOOKING AHEAD: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
¶57

There are roughly 840 million people worldwide who do not receive enough energy
through food to live actively.163 Many of these people are concentrated is the world’s
poorest seventy countries.164 Malnutrition plays a significant role in nearly 12 million
deaths per year of children under five.165 While there are 80 million new people to feed
yearly, world grain production growth decreased from three to one percent over the last
decade.166
¶58
Genetically modifying technology plays a significant role in food growth and
production.167 Strong IP protections on the products of this technology are important to
foster the development of improved seeds that are resistant to insects, diseases, droughts,
and pesticides while increasing crop yield and nutritional content.168 Yet, in order for
156
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these improvements to be effective, products must be made available to the people who
need them the most. A balance must be struck between these two diverging interests.
¶59
First, I will look at how genetically modified seeds can potentially alleviate some
of the challenges facing the developing world. Second, I will look at how public and
private partnerships can be successful vehicles for change. Partnerships can balance the
need for strong IP protections for businesses while maintaining developing world access
to genetically modified seeds.
A. Agriculture and Developing Nations
¶60

Agriculture products, staple crops in particular, are a fundamental resource for the
poor. Drought, poor soil, plant disease, and political instability all contribute to the
dangers of malnutrition and poverty.169 Genetically engineered seeds potentially have the
ability to combat malnutrition and poverty by creating specialty crops with high
productivity, better nutritional value, and enhanced resistance to disease.170 Currently,
crop yields in Africa are far below their genetic potential. Grain imports now comprise
twenty-five percent of grain consumption in Africa—a dependency that has only
increased over the past three decades.171
¶61
Rising agricultural productivity is directly related to economic growth in
developing nations.172 Agriculture is not only important for producing enough food, but
it is key to job creation and employment in most agriculturally based developing nation
economies.173 Small farms are the “engine for progress” in rural areas.174 In many
developing nations, sixty to ninety percent of citizens depend on farming for their
livelihood.175 Developing nations also need to increase agriculture exports in order to
spur economic growth.176 Fair access to trade is therefore fundamental for developing
nations. Trade issues are closely connected to social and economic issues, “policies
without immediate economic gain will upset the fragile economic and social balance in
developing nations.”177 Unfortunately, it is not clear developing nations will experience
immediate economic gain from TRIPS.
169
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TRIPS provisions on genetically modified materials create policies highly
unpopular with the populations of developing nations, making enforcement difficult.178
Resistance to TRIPS has been growing for years in developing nations, some of which
has turned violent. In India in 1998, protesters set fire to Monsanto trial fields during a
disobedience operation called “Operation Cremation Monsanto”.179 Following the India
protests and similar protests in Bangladesh, farmers in the Philippines staged violent
protests at the offices of Monsanto.180 This additional instability in developing nations is
not only troublesome for fragile governments, but also economically detrimental in the
long and short term. These reactions also dissuade foreign companies from investing in
countries that react violently to their policies and products, thereby keeping valuable
capital and jobs out of the country.181
B. Partnerships

¶63

Private firms now lead in research and development of GM seeds—a role once
dominated by governments and international public institutions.182 This poses a variety
of challenges for developing nations. While the aim of the private sector is to increase
profits, the priorities of developing nations are to fight poverty and protect public
health.183 The long-term decline in public sector research diminished the incentives for
sharing access and genetic information on newly developed seeds.184
¶64
There is an international movement to increase public sector efforts to create crops
that benefit poor farmers.185 In order to make this a reality, the private sector must share
the latest technological advances with the public sector.186 The recognition that research
must also focus on public needs spurred a number of partnerships in the public and
private sectors.187
¶65
The Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research (“CGIAR”) is
perhaps the biggest player on public seed access on the international front. The CGIAR
system consists of sixteen international research centers that focus on staple crops similar
to wheat, maize, and potatoes.188 CGIAR is responsible for the development of “Golden
Rice,” a vitamin A enriched rice that takes genes from daffodils and micro-organisms.189
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Vitamin A depletion is a critical cause of malnutrition, and Golden Rice has the potential
to save many lives.
CGIAR is also an umbrella organization for other efforts to alleviate poverty and
strengthen food security in Africa. The African Rice Center (“WARDA”) is funded by
CGIAR and based in the Ivory Coast.190 WARDA encourages partnerships on all levels
to increase the productivity and profitability of rice. In particular, they are working on a
variety of hybrid rice that combines African genetic traits with productive Asian species
(“NERICA”).191 In trials, use of NERICAs increased productivity by about twenty-five
to two hundred and fifty percent.192
The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (“PIPRA“) is another
example of a public/private partnership formed to alleviate the difficulties experienced by
the public sector in securing access to technologies.193 The organization’s purpose is to
aid “public sector agriculture resource institutions [in] achiev[ing] their public mission by
ensuring access to intellectual property to develop and distribute improved staple and
specialty crops.”194 PIPRA is working with the USDA and foreign agencies to create an
IP asset database of all patented agriculture technologies. This would allow public sector
researchers to stay informed about who holds patents and who is currently conducting
research.195
The Meridian Institute is another non-governmental organization with a mission to
solve problems and conflicts that result from international environmental, health,
economic, and social issues. The Meridian Institute hopes to start a dialogue about
agriculture issues between policy-makers, industry representatives, NGOs, scientists,
academics, and other key players.196
Efforts such as these demonstrate how strong IP protections can be balanced with
the needs of the developing world.
IV. CONCLUSION

¶70

The long and complex history of intellectual property rights and seed technology
illustrates how political and business motives play an integral role in deciding policy. It
also illustrates the importance of legal decisions and interpretation. Judicial decisions in
the United States played a major role in developing intellectual property rights not only
for the United States, but for the world. Many of today’s large agribusinesses are
founded upon American case law.
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Domestically, the United States developed a complex IP regime over a long period
of time. Many developing nations are just beginning this process. Despite this, there is
pressure from developed nations to accelerate this process and implement sophisticated
IP regulations. As the world leader in IP protections for the life sciences, the United
States, through the USTR, exerts this pressure on developing nations and maintains its
dominance through strict trade agreements like TRIPS.
¶72
Strong IP protections for genetically modified seeds are partly responsible for the
rapid growth and ingenuity of new seed varieties. Yet, while TRIPS resulted in great
benefits for science and large agribusinesses, developing nations do not stand to gain
nearly as much from groundbreaking technological advances. An imbalance exists
between the benefits derived by the Northern hemisphere and the toll taken on the
Southern hemisphere with respect to knowledge transfer.
¶73
Public-private partnerships have the potential to even out this imbalance. These
partnerships can fill the void left by the private sector in addressing public needs. As
illustrated by existing partnerships, developing nations can benefit from genetic
technological advances while still satisfying the needs of the private sector.
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